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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the incidence and consequences of educational mismatch in Estonia,
an economy that has su¤ered a rapid period of structural transformation. Estonia joined
the European Union (EU) together with other 9 Central and Eastern European countries
on May 1st 2004. A prominent feature of these new EU members was their low GDP
per capita when compared to the older partners. Overall, the new members increased
the EU population by 20%, reaching 450 million, while the Unions GDP increased by
only 5%. These sharp di¤erences in terms of GDP per capita brought new challenges
for both the old and new member states. Regarding the latter group, it is often argued
that one of the channels that should facilitate their economic convergence towards the
levels of wellbeing experienced by the former states (hereinafter the EU-15) is the high
level of education of their workforce.1 This view is based on indicators of average years
of schooling in the new members, which are often higher than those of the EU-15. In
Estonia, among people aged over 25 the average level of schooling in 1999 was 9.2 years,
clearly greater than the EU-15 average of 8.7 (Barro and Lee, 2001). For the other new
EU members, the numbers are similar; e.g., Poland had 9.2 years of schooling on average.
We argue that this fact needs to be qualied, in the sense that in the new EU mem-
bers, education was designed to meet the needs of a centrally planned economy, and
workershuman capital might not be best suited to rapidly catching up with the west.
In Lamo, Messina and Wasmer (2006) we show that skill specicities in former centrally
planned economies slow down signicantly the adjustment process in periods of rapid
structural changes. In this paper, we study mismatches in formaleducation (hereafter
called educational mismatch) in Estonia during the period 1997-2003. Workershuman
capital depreciation might bring in mismatches between their formal education and their
jobs. This might not necessarily imply a mismatch between workersproductive skills and
the skills required by the market, but simply that workers were trained with skills that
are actually not demanded anymore. Hence, even if individuals are optimally allocated
given their productive skills, they might be formally overeducated. For the purposes
1See for instance Caselli and Tenreyro (2004), who make this point when they discuss the prospects
of convergence for Poland.
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of our study, Estonia constitutes an ideal laboratory. Estonia quickly adjusted from a
centrally planned to a free market economy in the early 1990s. It went through a process
of drastic reforms, which resulted in strong sectoral reallocations and a rapid privatiza-
tion of the public rms. By 1997, the starting period for this studys analysis, Estonia
had been transformed into a fully functional market economy. Moreover, its regula-
tory and labour market institutions o¤er a very exible environment for EU standards,
characterized by relatively low employment protection and unemployment benets, and
almost non-existent trade unions. Compared to other transition countries, the relatively
weak safety nets and extremely exible wage setting institutions (see Messina and Rõõm,
2009) in Estonia are likely to keep in the market workers who su¤ered important skill
depreciations.
A large volume of empirical literature studies the consequences of mismatches be-
tween workersformal education and their jobseducational requirements. In all of these
studies a wage penalty is associated with the overeducation phenomenon, i.e., workers
who are educated for a more qualied job than the one they hold earn less than work-
ers with the same education but holding in a job that requires their qualication level.
A major di¢ culty in interpreting this wage penalty as the causal e¤ect of educational
mismatch on wages lies on the treatment of unobserved heterogeneity. Skills unobserved
by the econometrician (e.g., low ability) might be correlated with overeducation and
wages, biasing the estimated coe¢ cients. Bauer (2002) shows that almost 70% of the
wage penalty associated with overeducation dissipates once individual xed e¤ects are
introduced in a panel framework. Although appealing, panel techniques might not solve
all selection problems. If more able individuals are more likely to leave the jobs for which
they are overeducated, panel estimates would also deliver biased coe¢ cients. Moreover,
as is well know, individual e¤ects exacerbate the impact of measurement errors, inherent
in any measure of overeducation. Other approaches dealing with unobserved heterogene-
ity include the use of instrumental variables (Dolton and Silles, 2001), controlling for
ability using di¤erent proxies (see Chevalier, 2003 and McGuinness, 2003) and proxying
ability by di¤erentiating between groups of workers in a quantile regression framework
(Budría and Moro-Egido, 2006 and McGuinness and Bennett, 2007). More recently,
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non-parametric approaches have been proposed to deal with the problem of confounding
factors (McGuinness, 2008, McGuinness and Sloane, 2009 and Mavromaras, McGinness
and Fok, 2009). Our paper is directly related to the latter.
Our preferred estimates rely on nearest neighbors matching estimator techniques
(Abadie and Imbens, 2006), which do not impose any functional form on the impact of
formal overeducation (hereafter overeducation) on wages. More importantly, we do
several robustness exercises that show the impact of unobserved heterogeneity in the
estimates, following Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2008). In the absence of strong priors
about the exogeneity of overeducation or credible instruments, our strategy is to assess
non-parametrically how robust our results are to the presence of an unobserved con-
founder, which can be simulated in several forms. A similar strategy has been proposed
by McGuinness and Sloane (2009) and Mavromaras et al. (2009). The former studies
the e¤ects of educational mismatches on wages in the market of UK graduates, while
the latter studies the incidence and wage impact of skill mismatches in the Australian
labor market. In both cases, sensitivity analysis of the wage e¤ects of overeducation
(or overskilling) are carried out following Rosenbaum (2002), which allows examining
the sensitivity of signicance levels and condence intervals in the presence of an un-
observed variable. Like Rosenbaum (2002), we do not rely on any parametric model.
Di¤erently from previous papers, our method aims instead at assessing the sensitivity
of point estimates (rather than condence intervals), under di¤erent scenarios for the
distribution of the confounding factor.
Our ndings indicate that the incidence of overeducation in Estonia during the period
of study is higher among older workers, and in the case of women it increases monoton-
ically with age. The wage penalty associated with overeducation is quite large, lowering
wages on average by 24%. Moreover, this wage penalty also increases with age: older
overeducated workers receive a higher wage penalty than (otherwise similarly) younger
overeducated workers. In order to assess the impact of various forms of unobserved
heterogeneity in the estimated e¤ects, we rst assume that selection on the unobserv-
ables is the same as selection on the observables, in an empirical strategy that closely
resembles Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005). We nd that in this case the impact on the
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estimates is minimal. Next, we pose to the data the following question. Suppose there is
an unobserved factor, call it ability, which is negatively correlated with wages but is
more likely to be present among the overeducated individuals. Under what distribution
of this confounding factor the impact of overeducation on wages is driven to zero? As
expected, our results are sensitive to the distribution of this confounding factor, but
remain negative and highly signicant even in relatively extreme cases. Suppose that
among the overeducated 85% are low ability individuals, while only 15% of the well-
matched belong to this group. Further, assume that the probability of nding a low
ability worker with a wage below the mean among well-matched individuals doubles
the probability of nding a low abilityworker with a wage above the mean. Then,
once this confounding factor is taken into account in the estimation, the elasticity of
wages on overeducation declines to -0.16 (from -0.24 in the baseline) for females, and to
-0.14 (from -0.24) for males, and remains highly signicant. Similar exercises lead us to
conclude that all the wage penalty associated with educational mismatches is unlikely
to be driven by unobserved worker characteristics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an institutional and
macroeconomic background of the Estonian economy. Section 3 discusses the theoretical
underpinnings of overeducation, the di¤erent measures of overeducation proposed in
the literature and the data used in this paper, while Section 4 studies the incidence
of overeducation in Estonia. Section 5 discusses the matching estimator applied in the
rest of the paper and studies the consequences of overeducation for wages. Section 6
assesses the quality and reliability of the estimates, paying special attention to the role
of unobserved heterogeneity. Section 7 presents our studys conclusions.
2 Background
Estonia joined the EU following more than a decade of major reforms intended to real-
locate its resources and change its institutional structures so that it would be compliant
with market economy principles. Estonia is a small country that, after gaining indepen-
dence from the Soviet Union in 1991, introduced its own currency pegged to the German
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DM. It then launched drastic economic reforms, which have been qualied as leading to
some of the most rapid and successful transitions. Currently Estonia has an extremely
open economy, with a reasonably sized public sector (most public companies were pri-
vatized before 1993). This transition to a market economy was accomplished through
a large increase in worker ows (Haltiwanger and Vodopivec, 2002) and sectoral reallo-
cation: the proportion of agricultural workers dropped from over 20% in 1990 to 8% in
2000. At the same time, there was a remarkable increase in the proportion workers em-
ployed in services: from 43% in 1990 to about 60% in 2002. Following the 1992 reforms,
Estonia experienced negative real GDP growth rates during three consecutive years until
1995, when the economy started to recover. In 1999, one year after the announcement
that Estonia would join the EU, the GDP growth rate again became negative, and since
then recovered strongly in 2000 to reach a stable growth level of 6.5% up to 2003. The
unemployment rate was 9.2% in 1998 and increased between 1999 and 2000 (11.3 and
12.5% respectively), but subsequently it declined to 11.8 and 9.1% in 2001 and 2002.
By EU standards, Estonias market economy is considered very exible in terms of
labour legislation and labour market institutions. Moreover, there is no e¤ective trade
union movement inuencing wages in Estonia. Since 1991 the government has only set
minimum wages, while individual wages have been set at the rm level through bilateral
agreements between employers and employees. No policy has been established to prevent
bankruptcy, and layo¤s and separation costs remained very low during the period of
analysis. The Employment Contracts Actwas introduced in 1992, in order to stimulate
labour reallocation. This law gave employers the right to layo¤workers with two months
notication. At the same time workers are entitled to a maximum severance payment
equivalent to 4 times their monthly salary. Because this established no limitations on
renewals, it also opened up the possibility of the extensive use of temporary contracts,
but their cumulative duration should not exceed 5 years. Unemployment insurance and
income support are not very generous in Estonia. Unemployment benets have been
xed at 60% of the minimum wage, which amounts to less than 25% of the average
wage. Replacement ratios dropped from 32% in 1990 to 7% in 1998, and eligibility
conditions are also very restrictive. The duration of unemployment benets is limited to
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6 months, after which the unemployed could receive social assistance, which is also very
limited. Consequently, it can be hardly argued that unemployment benets and social
assistance have any disincentive e¤ect on labour supply. Only training programs act as
active labour market policies in Estonia. From 1993 to 1995, both public expenditures
and participation in training programs increased substantially.
3 Educational mismatch: theoretical considerations and
empirical identication
Educational mismatch may be a permanent or a temporary state. In a matching frame-
work, Jovanovic (1979) shows that temporary educational mismatches can arise due
to ine¢ ciencies in the functioning of the labour market associated with imperfect in-
formation and mobility. Educational mismatch is also a temporary phenomenon in a
career mobility framework, where young workers voluntarily accept jobs for which they
are overeducated in exchange of a skill acquisition process that will complement their
qualications (Sicherman and Galor, 1990). In both cases workers are expected to im-
prove over time their matches either through job-to-job mobility or mobility within the
rm. Hence, educational mismatches are expected to alleviate while the worker obtains
labour market experience. Educational mismatches, on the other hand, might reect
a permanent phenomenon. This is the case in models where employers use formal ed-
ucation as a screening device (Spence, 1973) or when low and high educated workers
compete for scarce jobs in the presence of frictions (see Albrecht and Vroman, 2002 and
Dolado, Jansen and Jimeno, 2008). In the latter models, structural mismatches may be
exacerbated by supply forces such as rapid educational upgrades in the labour force, or
by demand forces, such as skill biased technological change. Both cases imply a rapid
change in the demand for or supply of certain educational group that cannot be easily
matched on the other side of the market.
A large volume of empirical literature studies the determinants and economic con-
sequences of mismatches between individuals formal education and the educational
requirements of their jobs. Following Freemans (1976) seminal book, this literature
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identies workers as being over or undereducated relative to their job, and studies the
consequences of educational mismatches on wages and other labour market outcomes.
Regarding the impact of overeducation on earnings, McGuinness (2006) reviews this lit-
erature and concludes that all studies nd a signicant wage penalty associated with
overeducation, which averages at 15 percent lower wages. Although there is some dis-
agreement in the literature on the rationale for temporary mismatches, i.e., if they are
related to market failures or career mobility, most studies nds signs of overeducation
being a temporary phenomenon. The fact that overeducation is typically higher during
the school to work transition years is suggestive of the short term nature of educa-
tional mismatches. Consistent with this interpretation, overeducation has been found
to be associated with higher mobility rates (e.g., Alba-Ramírez, 1993, Sloane, Battu,
and Seaman, 1999 and Groot and van den Brink, 2003) or within rm promotions (e.g.,
Alba-Ramírez and Blázquez, 2003 and Groeneveld and Hartog, 2004). Also in line with a
temporary interpretation, Groot (1996) nds that overeducation declines with age. How-
ever, in contrast with overeducation being a temporary phenomenon, several studies of
the labour market of graduates fail to nd a declining incidence of overeducation during
the rst years after graduation (see McGuinness and Wooden, 2009 for a discussion).
The empirical literature on education mismatch typically relies on three kinds of
measures of over/undereducation, depending on the specic features of the data set and
the information available: i) objective or data-based measures are based on contrasts
between the actual distribution of workerseducational attainment and an (estimated)
adequate level of education per occupation. This adequate level of education is either
measured as a function of the average (see Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989) or the modal
(Mendes de Oliveira, Santos and Kiker, 2000) level of education for each occupation, ii)
measures based on the contrast between the educational level of workers and the required
level of education for their job, derived from systematic evaluation by job analysts who
specify the required level of education for the job titles in an occupational classication
(Hartog, 1980) and iii) the so-called subjective or direct measures of education mismatch,
based on workersself-assessments (Sicherman, 1981). There are pros and cons associated
with each of these measures. The advantage of educational mismatch measures based on
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worker self-assessment is that they identify how the individuals situation can be assigned
relative to the education mismatch, and precisely with the individuals job, and not with
any kind of aggregate (Hartog, 2000). The disadvantage however is that they might
su¤er from workersmisperceptions regarding their actual job requirements. The main
arguments in favour of data-based indexes is that they are not impeded by subjectivity,
yet one important drawback is that di¤erent denitions of what constitutes adequate
schooling levels typically deliver very di¤erent results. Conceptually, systematic analysis
from job analysts should provide the best measures of required education for the job.
However, van der Velden and van Smoorenburg (1997) show that worker self assessments
of the educational requirements for their jobs are typically much more accurate than
expert rating of job titles. Moreover, systematic expert rating analysis is expensive and
consequently infrequently updated. This renders the characterization of jobs rapidly
obsolete, especially in periods of rapid structural changes.
3.1 The data
The Estonian labour force survey (ELFS) has a structure very similar to the LFSs car-
ried out in the other EU member states, using internationally agreed concepts and de-
nitions as proposed by the International Labor Organization (ILO). It contains standard
demographic and job characteristics, and its longitudinal nature allows individuals to be
followed for a maximum of 1.5 years. The ELFS was rst conducted in 1995 and on an
annual basis until 2000q1, when the methodology changed. From 2000q2 the data was
collected quarterly and the panel followed a 2-2-2 rotation plan. This implies that every
household was interviewed for two quarters, not observed during the next two quarters
and interviewed again for two consecutive quarters. All the surveys are stratied sam-
ples of the population census, and are representative of the population in the age bracket
15-74. The response rate is very high, always above 90%. The 1997 survey interviewed
5,555 individuals, while the 1998 and 1999 ELFS sampled around 14,000 individuals,
and 25% of the 1998 sample was retained in the 1999 survey. After 2000, some 10,000
individuals are interviewed every year. From the rst part of the survey we retained the
1997, 1998 and 1999 waves, which contain information from the second quarter of the
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year, and then we exploited the quarterly information thereafter.2 Our analysis period
is 1997-2003.
The Estonian labour force survey made it possible to construct a direct educational
mismatch measure, based on the respondentsperceived level of required education for
their job. All employees were asked: Does your job correspond to your educational
level?and were o¤ered three response options: Yes, No, the job presupposes a more
advanced level of education or No, the job presupposes a lower level of education.
Note that the question explicitly asks about the educational level, and not about the
skills of the individual. The question should be informative about the quality of the
match between the formal education received by the worker and the level of education
required for her job. Hence, it is certainly possible that workers who answer negatively
to the above question are paid according to their relative productivities. In other words,
the presence of mismatch in our sample is not necessarily indicative of market failures in
the Estonian labour market. It might simply reect that workers were trained for jobs
or occupations that are not demanded in the market anymore.
Using this information it is possible to directly construct measures of over/undereducation.
In our data 12.6% of the workers declared that they were overeducated for the job, and
2.5% were undereducated. Since the estimation methodology described in Section 5 was
designed for dichotomous treatment, we focused the analysis on the overeducated, and
excluded undereducated from the sample.3 The outcome measure in the paper is the net
monthly wage. When the individual is employed in more than one job, we retain the job
with the highest salary as the main job. We limit the sample to employees, in the age
bracket 16-65.
2The 1997, 1998, and 1999 contain retrospective information that can be used to construct quarterly
data. However, the information on the matching between the education of the individual and the job
refers to the reference week (the second quarter of each year).
3We have estimated OLS regressions, including both over and undereducation indicators, and did not
nd a signicant di¤erence in wages between undereducated and well-matched workers. We obtain very
similar results when we apply matching estimators to the sample of workers who are undereducated,
having well-matched workers as the control group.
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4 Who is overeducated in Estonia
Table 1 lists certain summary statistics showing important di¤erences between overe-
ducated and well-matched workers. On average the latter earn more and have fewer
years of education than the overeducated. Among women and interestingly among older
workers, there is a higher incidence of the overeducation. For more detail on the rela-
tionship between overeducation and age see Figure 1, which reveals that the incidence
of overeducation for females increases monotonically with age, yet slightly less so for
older workers. For males, the age overeducation prole increases (non-monotonically)
with age, and among the older cohorts overeducated individuals are overrepresented. It
is also interesting to note that Estonian origin individuals (based on the rst language
spoken at home) are much more likely to be well match than workers from other origins.
As for job features, overeducated workers seem to concentrate more on the private sec-
tor and in manufacturing in particular, and also exhibit lower job tenure (4.5 years on
average versus 7.3 for the well-matched).
To obtain a better understanding of the factors behind overeducation, we estimate
a probit model where the dependent variable is assigned the value 1 when individuals
declare themselves to be overeducated for the job. We do this separately for males
and females, as overeducation seemed to follow di¤erent patterns in each case. Table 2
lists the marginal e¤ects evaluated at the mean of the continuous variables, and discrete
changes in the case of the dichotomous variables, of the expected changes in the predicted
overeducation probability as a function of personal and job characteristics. Since we
observe individuals more than once, we report robust standard errors and allow for
clustering at the individual level.
According to the estimates in Table 2, the patterns observed concerning age are
conrmed by the regression analysis; i.e., overeducation increases monotonically with
age among women, while for males, overeducation is concentrated among the oldest,
even though the age prole is not monotonic. Remarkable di¤erences are also observed
between the genders concerning the importance of certain job features, such as sector of
operation and rm size. Similarly, working in the public sector increases the probability
of being overeducated much more for male than for female workers. Di¤erences across
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Estonian and other origin remain, but the marginal e¤ects both for males and females
become quite small when controlling for other characteristics.
It must be stressed that some of the job characteristics included in these probit regres-
sions might be considered endogenous with respect to overeducation, since overeducated
workers may tend to concentrate on certain sectors or remain in their jobs for shorter
periods. We will take care of this simultaneity in the next section, when we evaluate the
consequences of overeducation for wages.
This exploratory analysis provided a remarkable message in that age increases the
likelihood of being overeducated, and this nding is in contrast with previous empirical
evidence (see Groot, 1996). From a human capital perspective, this is suggestive of
structural changes in the Estonian labour market wherein new abilities are required,
that the old educational system failed to provide.4 The rest of this paper studies the
impact of overeducation on wages, and whether that impact di¤ers across cohorts.
5 The impact of overeducation on wages
5.1 Methodology
In this section we investigate the consequences of educational mismatch on wages by es-
timating Mincerian earnings regressions that include a dummy for overeducation among
the covariates, making it possible to compare wages of workers su¤ering from education
mismatch with those of workers having similar features but being well-matched. This
approach was rst applied by Duncan and Ho¤man (1981), and has generated a wide
range of literature, typically nding that a wage penalty is associated with overeduca-
tion. Our dependent variable is the log of hourly wages and we separate the male and
female sub-samples. Moreover, as we observed that the incidence of overeducation was
higher among older workers, we split the sample in di¤erent age groups to assess whether
4 In alternative specications, we have identied individuals who attended school entirely under central
planning and compared them to those who got at least some formal education after 1991. The results,
available upon request, are very similar for females, suggesting that the likelihood of being overeducated
is higher for those who studied during the previous regime. In the case of males, the signs are the
expected but signicance greatly depends on the specic assumptions we make about the threshold for
education before and after.
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in the case of Estonia the wage penalty typically associated with overeducation varies
with age.
We estimate the wage penalty associated with being overeducated (educational mis-
match) using standard regression analysis as well as matching estimators as proposed by
Abadie and Imbens (2006), hereinafter referred to as AI. In contrast with OLS, matching
does not impose any functional form. The principle behind the simple matching estima-
tor is that for each individual there are two potential outcomes, one for individuals who
follow the treatment and another for those who do not follow, i.e., those belonging to
the control group. The di¤erence between these potential outcomes lies in the treatment
e¤ect on the individual. Only one of these potential outcomes is observed however, and
the other needs to be estimated. To do so, the simple matching estimate uses informa-
tion on similar individuals who follow the opposite treatment. In our case the outcome
are wages, the treatment group consists of overeducated workers and the control group
comprises well-matched workers. Our objective is to estimate the average e¤ect of the
treatment, i.e., the wage penalty for being overeducated.
For each individual i, i = 1; ::::N; we observe the triple (Wi; Xi; Yi), where Xi is
a vector of covariates, Wi 2 f0; 1g is an indicator on whether individual i received
treatment or not, and Yi denotes the realized outcome, which is equal to Yi(0) if the
individual is well-matched, i.e., she is part of the control group and to Yi(1) if she is
overeducated, i.e., she belongs to the treatment group.
Yi  Yi(Wi) =
8<: Yi(0) if Wi = 0Yi(1) if Wi = 1. (1)
We are interested in what AI refers to as the average e¤ect on the treated population
(ATT) (p;t) and in the sample average treatment e¤ect on the treated( s;t):
p;t = E[Yi(1)  Yi(0)jWi = 1] and  s;t = 1
N1
X
i:Wi=1
(Yi(1)  Yi(0)),
where N1 =
PN
i=1Wi stands for the number individuals in the treated group.
To ensure identication and consistency for the estimated treatment e¤ects, two
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regularity conditions must hold:
Unconfoundedness: for almost every x in the support of X, the assignment to treat-
ment W is independent of the outcome, conditional on the covariates X;
E[Y (w)jX = x] = E[Y (w)jW = w;X = x]. (2)
This is also known as selection of observables or the conditional independence assump-
tion. This assumption is crucial, as it allows the realized outcome of individuals having
the same covariates values as the opposite group to be used as a valid control group.
Thus, the average treatment e¤ect can be recovered by averaging E[Y jW = 1; X =
x]  E[Y jW = 0; X = x] over the distribution of X.
Overlap: for almost every x in the support of X, c < Pr(W = 1jX = x) < 1  c, for
some c. This assumption implies that the conditional probability of receiving treatment,
also known as the propensity score, is bounded away from zero and one. This simply
guarantees that for any treated individual there would be some individuals in the non-
treated group having similar covariate patterns.
For a formal discussion of these regularity conditions see Abadie and Imbens (2006)
and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Unconfoundedness is the most controversial assump-
tion in most empirical applications, and our case constitutes no exception. We discuss
this thoroughly in section 6 and provide evidence supporting its plausibility.
The matching estimator that we consider imputes the missing potential outcome for
an individual, using information on observed outcomes of individuals who are closein
terms of their covariate values. We will do matching with replacement, i.e., allow each
individual in the control group to be used in more than one match, since this technique
produces better matches than that without replacement by increasing the set of possible
matches. The simple matching estimator for the ATT estimates the missing potential
outcomes Y (0) when Wi = 1 as the average of the outcomes of the nearest neighbors
belonging to the control group:
Y^i(0) =
8<: Yi if Wi = 01
M
P
j2IM (i) Yj if Wi = 1
, (3)
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where IM (i) is the set of indices for the rst M matches for individual i. Hence, the
simple matching estimator for the average treatment e¤ect for the treated discussed in
AI is:
^ sm;t =
1
N1
X
i:Wi=1
(Yi   Y^i(0)), (4)
where N1 denotes the number of treated individuals in the sample. AI show that due
to matching discrepancies this estimator has a bias of the order O(N 1=K), where K
is the number of continuous covariates. They suggest combining the matching process
with a regression in order to adjust the di¤erences within the matches to the di¤erences
in their covariate values. This adjustment is based on an estimate of the regression
function w(x)  E[Y (w)jX = x] for the control group.5 This bias adjustment makes
the matching estimators N1=2 consistent. In our case, as will be seen in the next section,
no major discrepancies exist between simple matching and bias corrected estimators.
This might be expected because our only continuous control variables are age, job tenure
and years of schooling.
5.2 Estimation Results
Our aim is to provide robust evidence of the consequences of educational mismatch. To
this end we report average wage penalties for the overeducated according to various esti-
mation methods: i) the unconditional mean di¤erence estimator, ii) OLS estimators and
iii) several matching estimators. We present the results of simple matching and biased
adjusted matching techniques for one and four matches (M=1 and M=4, respectively).
We also examine two di¤erent equation specications; the rst including a restricted
number of controls, from which we have excluded certain job features that could be en-
dogenous to overeducation (e.g., tenure, rm size, sector of operation). These are most
likely intermediate outcomes, and hence if included in the regression a downward bias is
likely to inuence the overall e¤ect of overeducation on wages. The second specication
includes a larger number of controls, some of which are the above mentioned potential
5AI use nonparametric estimation to impute the value for the non-treated.
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intermediate outcomes.
Table 3 shows the estimated average wage penalty (ATT) separately for the entire
sample of males and females, using the above- mentioned estimation methods and the
baseline set of covariates. The regressors included are a dummy for ethnic origin, two
dummies for marital status, years of education, a quadratic in age, time and regional
dummies and an indicator variable for overeducation. The results are very robust across
the estimation methods. For Estonia the average wage penalty due to overeducation
is about 24 to 27 % for females, depending on the estimation method, and slightly
lower at 18 to 24% for males.6 It should be noted that this wage penalty is quite high
when compared to available results for other European countries (see Groot, Maasen
and Brink, 2000). Using comparable data and an overeducation measure similar to ours,
Budría and Moro-Egido (2006) nd that the wage penalty associated with overeducation
ranges from 2.6 to 10.9% across 12 EU-15 countries in the period 1994-2001.
Table 4 lists results for various age groups; it decomposes the sample into four age
categories: 16-29, 30-39, 40-49 and 50-64. When we look at age groups, it is interesting
to note that the penalty for younger cohorts (aged 16 to 29) is drastically smaller and less
stable across the various methods; between 4 and 9% for women and between 8 and 13%
for men. In both the male and female cases the wage penalty associated with overeduca-
tion increases with age. In the case of females this increase is progressive: overeducated
females aged 50-64 have a higher wage penalty than middle aged females (40-49), with
a di¤erence of around 5 percentage points and with small variations, depending on the
estimation method used. The di¤erence between middle-aged females and those aged
30-39 is slightly smaller, at about 3 percentage points. For males the di¤erences across
cohorts have similar magnitudes; with the oldest males hit by the highest wage penalty,
ranging between 33 and 35%.7
6A potential problem we do not deal with here relates to the labour market participation decision
of females. While female labour force participation is relatively high in Estonia (averaging at 66%
during the sample period) it is clearly lower than males (at 78%). To the extent that the most severely
overeducated females were out of the labour market, our estimates of the e¤ects of overeducation on
female wages would be downward biased.
7We have also splitted the sample between workers who nished school before 1991 and those who at
least had some schooling after this year, and we obtain very similar results. While the estimated e¤ects of
overeducation on wages are negative and highly signicant in the case of workers trained entirely during
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Table 5 lists the estimated ATT according to age groups for our extended speci-
cation, where we add to the above-mentioned control set the following (potentially
endogenous) variables: a quadratic in tenure, a public sector dummy, rm-size dummies
and sectoral dummies. The table only displays OLS and our preferred matching estima-
tor (the bias adjusted matching estimator for one match), because the results are very
similar for the alternative matching methods. Drastic changes are not observed with
respect to the basic specication. The order of magnitude of the wage penalty as well as
the age prole and the comparison between males and females barely remain unchanged,
but there is a slightly lower wage penalty for the oldest group in both genders, as well
as for males aged 30-39.
On average, wage penalties due to overeducation appear to be much higher in Estonia
than in other EU-15 countries where similar studies were done. Interestingly, the wage
penalty in Estonia associated with overeducation among young workers is lower than
that found for older cohorts, and of similar magnitude to that found in other EU-15
countries. This highlights that the di¤erential behavior of the Estonian labour market
when it comes to wage penalties associated with overeducation lies in the older cohorts.
6 Assessing the quality and reliability of the estimates
This section provides some evidence supporting the reliability of our estimates. First,
it assesses the quality of matching, that is, whether individuals in the treatment and
control groups are really alike. Second, some sensitivity analyses are made regarding the
robustness of our estimates in the event that the unconfoundedness assumption fails.
6.1 Quality of the matching
To evaluate the quality of matched pairs used in our estimation we follow the same strat-
egy as Abadie and Imbens (2006). Table 6 lists evidence of the quality of matching for
the variables used in the basic specication (excluding potential intermediate outcomes).
the communist regime, they present much smaller orders of magnitude (and are not always statistically
di¤erent from zero) for workers who obtained their diplomas after 1991.
17
All covariates were normalized such that their mean would be zero and their variance
would be equal to one. The rst panel lists the results of the female samples, and the
second panel lists those of the male samples. The second and third columns in Table
6 show the average value of each covariate for the overeducated and the well-matched
before matching. The di¤erence between the second and the third columns is reported
in the fourth column. The fth and sixth columns list the average of the covariates for
both groups, computed using the same observations as those in the single matching case
(M = 1). The seventh column displays the average di¤erence within the matched pairs
for each covariate. The matching is quite good, and its impact on the di¤erence between
overeducated and well-matched samples is substantial. Before matching, there were large
di¤erences between treated and control units for a relatively large set of control variables
(e.g., ethnic origin, divorced/widowed, county dummies). In all cases the average dif-
ference between the treatment and control group was much smaller after matching than
before (compare columns 4 and 7). For several covariates the matching was even exact
(the di¤erence after matching is zero or very close to zero).
6.2 Sensitivity to departures from the unconfoundedness assumption
The main behavioral assumption behind unconfoundedness is that in the case of no treat-
ment the potential outcome Y (0) does not inuence the treatment assignment once we
condition on the workersobservable features. This assumption is formally untestable,
because the available data provides no information regarding the wage distribution for
the overeducated workers in the case they were well matched (Yi(0) when Wi = 1),
but by using certain additional evidence its credibility can be supported/rejected. The
data used in our analysis includes information on a large number of worker and job
characteristics collected using the same sample and questionnaire for overeducated and
well-matched (treated and not treated) workers. Nevertheless, unobserved workershet-
erogeneity and/or measurement errors might be important factors that inuence the
treatment assignment. Low ability workers might need extra years of education to per-
form well their jobs. Similarly, discouraged workers might be more inclined to answer
that they feel properly suited to a more demanding job. If the market were to attribute
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a wage penalty for low ability or discouraged workers we would be overestimating the
impact of educational mismatch on wages.
To assess whether and to what extent the estimated wage penalty associated with
overeducation is robust for a potential unobservable confounder we follow Ichino, Mealli
and Nannicini (2008). They propose a sensitivity analysis that builds on Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) and is based on the following idea: suppose that unconfoundedness is
not satised given the observables,
E[Y (0)jW = 0; X] 6= E [Y (0)jW = 1; X] , (5)
but that it would be satised if we could observe an additional (unobservable) variable,
denoted by U , such that
E[Y (0)jW = 0; X; U ] = E[Y (0)jW = 1; X; U ]. (6)
This potential confounder can be then simulated in the data and used as an additional co-
variate in the estimation. The distribution of the simulated variable can be constructed to
capture di¤erent hypotheses regarding the failure of the unconfoundedness assumption.
The comparison of the estimates obtained with and without the simulated confounder
shows to what extent the results are robust regarding the assumptions failure.
We assume that U is a binary variable conditionally independent with respect to the
observables and we characterize its distribution by selecting the following probabilities:
pij  Pr(U = 1jW = i; Y = j) = Pr(U = 1jW = i; Y = j;X), (7)
where pij is the probability of U = 1 if the treatment is i and the outcome equals j; with
i; j 2 f0; 1g: Hence, there are four probabilities pij , one for each one of the groups dened
by treatment and outcome. Note that by stating that i; j 2 f0; 1g we assume that both
the treatment and outcome are binary variables, but in our case the outcome (wage)
is continuous. We therefore need to discretize it, and we do so by dening a binary
variable that takes value one if the wage is lower than the average wage and takes value
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zero if it is higher. We call this binary variable outcome.8 Then, given pij , a value of U
is attributed to each of the individuals, depending on which of the four groups dened
by the treatment status and the outcome value she/he belongs to. The simulated U is
then treated as any other observed covariate. Given the probabilities pij we repeat the
matching estimation 100 times for each set of values of the variable U and then calculate
a simulated estimate of the ATT by averaging over of the 100 estimated ATTs. As such,
the sensitivity analysis provides a point estimate of the ATT that is robust for the failure
of the unconfoundedness assumption according to that particular conguration of pij .
We can change the assumptions about the distribution of U , and in this way we
can assess the robustness of the ATT with respect to di¤erent hypotheses regarding the
nature of the confounding factor. An approach related to ours is proposed by Rosenbaum
(2002) and has been implemented by DiPrete and Gangl (2004). This method has
been applied in the context of overeducation and overskilling by McGuinness and Sloane
(2009) and Mavromaras et al (2009). The methodology relies on only one sensitivity
parameter (which represents the association betweenW and U), instead of the four (sets
of) parameters specied here. As a consequence, the joint distributions of W;Y1; U j X
and W;Y0; U j X are partially identied, and only bounds for signicance levels and
condence intervals can be derived. The approach taken here, by including (di¤erent
sets) of U in the matching set allows us assessing under which particular conditions the
estimated ATT (rather than the condence interval of the original estimates) is driven
to zero.
We start presenting a neutral conguration where pij takes the value 0.5 for every
i and j: In this case the distribution of U has no e¤ect on the selection of treatment
(p1   p0 = 0) or on the outcome of the non-treated (p01   p00 = 0).9 The second
conguration considered is such that the distribution of U resembles the age distribution
in our sample. Remember that combining the outcome (a wage above or below the mean)
8 Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2006) present two Monte Carlo exercises showing that discretisation
assumptions of this kind do not critically a¤ect the results of the sensitivity analysis.
9The di¤erence p1 p0captures a selection e¤ect, since it measures the e¤ect of U on the selection into
the treatment. The di¤erence p01   p00 might be labeled as an outcome e¤ect, as it captures the e¤ects
of U in absence of treatment. Note however, that these e¤ects need to be avaluated after conditioning
on W , as shown by Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2008).
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and the treatment status we have four categories of workers (per gender). Within each
of these categories, we calculate the percentage of workers older than the average in the
sample, and assign a probability of U = 1 equal to this percentage. For example, in the
group overeducated with earnings less than averagepertaining to the female sample,
54% of the workers are older than average. Hence, we assign a value U = 1 to 54% of the
workers in this group (p11 = :54 for females). The results of these two congurations are
listed in the second and third rows of Tables 7 and 8, for females and males respectively.
The rst row shows the estimated baseline ATT using only observables (M = 1, bias-
corrected estimators, see also Table 3) as covariates in the baseline specication. When
in the estimation we include the new simulated covariate described above to be neutral
(second row), the estimated ATT hardly di¤ers from that of the baseline, the di¤erence
being only -0.4 and 0.3 percentage points, for females and males respectively. When the
new covariate (simulated confounder) follows the empirical age distribution (third row),
the estimated ATTs are again very close to the baseline.
For simplicity in the rest of the exposition, we will think of U as an indicator of low
ability, but it could be any confounder factor that is negatively correlated with wages
and positively correlated with overeducation. Hence, we will refer to individuals with
U = 1 as low abilityindividuals, while individuals with U = 0 as high ability. Our
next exercises explore how extreme the distribution of U needs to be in order to generate
estimates that substantially depart from the baseline. We make two assumptions. First,
we postulate that low ability individuals (U = 1) are over-represented among the
treated (overeducated), which amounts to assuming that p1 > p0. Second, we assume
that within each group (treated and non-treated) the workers having low abilityare
more likely to obtain lower wages than those with U = 0. This implies that p11 > p10 and
p01 > p00. The results are listed under cases a) to g) in Tables 7 and 8. Concentrating
rst on the results for females (Table 7), case a) displays strong selection e¤ects and only
weak outcome e¤ects (p11 = 0:9; p10 = 0:8; p01 = 0:2; p00 = 0:1). The estimated impact
is reduced from -0.23 (no confounder) to -0.16, but remains highly signicant at the 1%
level. The following rows reect a progressive reduction in the share of low abilityindi-
viduals among the overeducated who have higher than average wages, and results are not
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greatly a¤ected. In case d), which looks at (p11 = 0:9; p10 = 0:5; p01 = 0:2; p00 = 0:1) ;
the estimated coe¢ cient is even larger, at -0.17, and highly signicant. The most strin-
gent tests are in cases e) to g), where low abilityindividuals are strongly represented
among the treated and those obtaining lower than average wages. Even in case g), where
we assume that 90% of the overeducated and 40% of the well-matched who su¤er a wage
penalty are low abilityworkers (p11 = 0:9; p10 = 0:5; p01 = 0:4; p00 = 0:1) ; there is a
sizable and statistically signicant negative impact of educational mismatch on wages:
 0:10 (s.e. 0:019). On top of the strong selection and outcome e¤ects we need to make
the extreme assumption that nobody among the well-matched workers with a wage above
the mean belongs to the low abilitygroup (p00=0) in order to nd an estimated impact
close to zero. This is so for case g) (p11 = 0:9; p10 = 0:5; p01 = 0:4; p00 = 0), where the
average coe¢ cient is -0.03 (s.e. 0.017). Similar conclusions are reached with the male
sample, presented in Table 8. In sum, to move the ATT away from the baseline results
we need to make fairly extreme assumptions regarding the selection e¤ects of U: This
bring us to conclude that it is unlikely that unobserved heterogeneity is driving the main
results presented in the paper.10
7 Conclusions
Estonia has undergone a rapid transition from a centrally planned to a market economy,
and then later a rapid transformation in its productive structure as a consequence of
its EU accession. This is an ongoing process and the consequences are likely to be long
lasting. This paper documents one of the outcomes of such a process: the mismatch
between the formal education of workers and the curricular content of their jobs.
Our research nds that there is a relatively high prevalence of educational mismatch
in Estonia; more than 12% of workers are formally overeducated for their jobs. More
10 Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2008) show that non parametric bounds for the ATT as those proposed
by Manski (1990) have an equivalent in terms of the distribution of U . The assumptions concerning the
confounder U that will lead the ATT to the bounds are quite extreme and highly implausible, explaining
why non parametric bounds are often uninformative. For the lower bound, we need to assume that among
the treated there are only individuals with U = 1, i.e. p11 = p10 = 1; and among the well matched all
the less able su¤er a wage penalty, i.e. p01 = 1: The upper bound is instead constructed as p11 = p10 = 1
and p01 = 0. The bounds of the ATT are (-0.56, 0.14) for females and (-0.56, 0.19) for males.
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importantly, the incidence and wage penalty for being overeducated in Estonia increases
with age, and is most concentrated among those workers who attended school during
the centrally planned regime. The wage penalties associated with overeducation are
fairly signicant (around 26%), except among younger cohorts, a group in which wage
losses associated with overeducation are of a magnitude comparable to those found in
other European countries. A battery of robustness checks using non-parametric methods
suggests that it is unlikely that these results are driven by unobserved heterogeneity.
Our ndings are consistent with the expectations from a rapidly changing transition
economy. A fast speed of structural change can render obsolete educational diplomas that
were obtained in the previous regime, triggering a mismatch between formal education
and labour demand. This implies that summary indicators of average years of schooling
in transition countries should be treated with caution, since they might constitute a poor
proxy for the true human capital of the working age population.
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Figure 1: Incidence of overeducation by Gender and Age
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Well-Matched Mismatched H0: Equal Means
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. t-value p-value
Hourly wage 4.199 0.616 3.946 0.582 24.8 0.00
Male 0.480 0.500 0.386 0.487 11.4 0.00
Estonian origin 0.733 0.442 0.522 0.499 28.01 0.00
Married 0.686 0.464 0.654 0.476 4.0 0.00
Divorce/widowed 0.129 0.335 0.191 0.393 -10.8 0.00
Years of education 12.821 2.222 13.490 1.801 -18.4 0.00
Age 41.166 11.665 42.419 11.572 -6.4 0.00
Tenure 7.335 8.696 4.540 5.939 19.9 0.00
Public sector 0.333 0.471 0.273 0.446 7.6 0.00
Firm size 20-99 0.375 0.484 0.368 0.482 0.9 0.35
Firm size 100-499 0.170 0.375 0.176 0.381 -1.02 0.31
Firm size 500+ 0.087 0.282 0.108 0.310 -4.38 0.00
Partime 0.075 0.263 0.116 0.320 -9.04 0.00
Agriculture 0.075 0.264 0.071 0.258 0.85 0.40
Fishing 0.005 0.071 0.004 0.060 1.23 0.22
Mining 0.015 0.123 0.021 0.144 -2.82 0.00
Manufacturing 0.250 0.433 0.311 0.463 -8.30 0.00
Elect, gas & water 0.027 0.162 0.022 0.148 1.76 0.08
Construction 0.064 0.245 0.045 0.208 4.67 0.00
Wholesale and retail 0.121 0.326 0.128 0.335 -1.33 0.18
Hotels and rest 0.022 0.148 0.032 0.176 -3.85 0.00
Transport 0.088 0.283 0.068 0.251 4.33 0.00
Financial interm 0.009 0.094 0.007 0.081 1.51 0.13
Real estate 0.042 0.202 0.064 0.246 -6.32 0.00
Public admin. 0.064 0.244 0.031 0.172 8.41 0.00
Education 0.114 0.318 0.097 0.296 3.26 0.00
Health 0.066 0.249 0.050 0.217 4.08 0.00
Others 0.036 0.187 0.049 0.216 -4.02 0.00
Note: Well-matched individuals: 29,288. Mismatched individuals: 4,332.
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Table 2: The incidence of overeducation. Marginal and percentage e¤ects from probit
regressions
Females Males
me¤ s.e. pvalue me¤ s.e. pvalue
Estonian origin -0.013 0.002 0.000 -0.010 0.002 0.000
Public sector -0.012 0.012 0.307 0.019 0.012 0.117
Partime 0.060 0.014 0.000 0.046 0.017 0.006
Married 0.010 0.010 0.312 -0.008 0.010 0.409
Divorced/widowed 0.035 0.012 0.003 0.041 0.017 0.015
Years of education 0.016 0.002 0.000 0.027 0.002 0.000
Aged 30-39 0.028 0.010 0.005 -0.001 0.009 0.901
Aged 40-49 0.066 0.011 0.000 0.014 0.010 0.147
Aged 50+ 0.080 0.012 0.000 0.039 0.009 0.000
Tenure (2-3y] -0.048 0.011 0.000 -0.040 0.008 0.000
Tenure (3-5y] -0.101 0.011 0.000 -0.056 0.011 0.000
Tenure (5-10y] -0.127 0.010 0.000 -0.091 0.009 0.000
Tenure (10y+ -0.154 0.008 0.000 -0.083 0.009 0.000
Firm size 20-99 0.005 0.008 0.582 0.007 0.008 0.328
Firm size 100-499 0.024 0.011 0.028 -0.006 0.008 0.447
Fishing -0.135 0.047 0.004 -0.020 0.028 0.483
Mining 0.175 0.072 0.015 0.008 0.024 0.743
Manufacturing -0.012 0.020 0.572 0.007 0.012 0.581
Elect, gas & water 0.039 0.045 0.386 -0.064 0.017 0.000
Construction -0.077 0.034 0.022 -0.028 0.013 0.035
Wholesale and retail -0.080 0.019 0.000 0.006 0.017 0.729
Hotels and rest -0.033 0.025 0.197 0.008 0.031 0.791
Transport -0.054 0.022 0.013 -0.048 0.014 0.000
Financial interm -0.104 0.032 0.001 -0.098 0.023 0.000
Real estate -0.017 0.024 0.466 0.000 0.021 0.997
Public admin. -0.121 0.021 0.000 -0.092 0.014 0.000
Education -0.082 0.022 0.000 -0.062 0.021 0.003
Health -0.099 0.022 0.000 -0.019 0.030 0.517
Others -0.013 0.027 0.616 -0.028 0.018 0.128
Note: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the individual level. * and ** denote signicant
at the 5 and 1 percent level respectively (two-tailed tests).
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Table 3: Educational mismatch and wages in Estonia
M Estimator Females Males
ATT s.e. ATT s.e.
 Mean di¤erence -0.271 0.012 -0.189 0.016
 OLS -0.278 0.011 -0.242 0.015
1 Simple matching -0.241 0.014 -0.238 0.021
1 Bias-adjusted -0.236 0.014 -0.246 0.021
4 Simple matching -0.253 0.012 -0.224 0.017
4 Bias-adjusted -0.242 0.012 -0.236 0.017
Note: Other covariates include language, marital status, years of education, age, age squared and
time and regional dummies. Number of observations: Females (Treated=2,528, Controls=14,754,
Total=17,282), Males (Treated=1,585, Controls=13,635, Total=15,220).
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Table 4: Educational mismatch and wages by age categories
Age Estimator Females Males
ATT s.e. (obs.) ATT s.e. (obs.)
16-29
Mean Di¤erence -0.085 0.033 N1=324 -0.109 0.035 N1=354
OLS -0.077 0.032 N=2,766 -0.112 0.033 N=3,649
M=1 Simple matching -0.041 0.047 -0.080 0.039
M=1 Bias-adjusted -0.019 0.046 -0.077 0.039
M=4 Simple matching -0.060 0.039 -0.097 0.035
M=4 Bias-adjusted -0.059 0.039 -0.136 0.035
30-39
Mean Di¤erence -0.309 0.036 N1=589 -0.192 0.037 N1=344
OLS -0.273 0.027 N=4,224 -0.188 0.035 N=3,569
M=1 Simple matching -0.259 0.030 -0.245 0.046
M=1 Bias-adjusted -0.239 0.029 -0.249 0.046
M=4 Simple matching -0.261 0.024 -0.212 0.036
M=4 Bias-adjusted -0.242 0.025 -0.215 0.036
40-49
Mean Di¤erence 0.273 0.019 N1=845 -0.215 0.032 N1=420
OLS -0.295 0.017 N=5,268 -0.293 0.031 N=4,009
M=1 Simple matching -0.256 0.021 -0.236 0.037
M=1 Bias-adjusted -0.254 0.021 -0.261 0.037
M=4 Simple matching -0.279 0.018 -0.247 0.029
M=4 Bias-adjusted -0.270 0.018 -0.282 0.029
50-64
Mean Di¤erence -0.320 0.028 N1=770 -0.217 0.028 N1=467
OLS -0.344 0.021 N=5,024 -0.344 0.026 N=3,993
M=1 Simple matching -0.295 0.029 -0.323 0.039
M=1 Bias-adjusted -0.295 0.029 -0.354 0.039
M=4 Simple matching -0.315 0.024 -0.306 0.030
M=4 Bias-adjusted -0.306 0.024 -0.332 0.030
Note: Other covariates include language, marital status, years of education and time and regional
dummies.
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Table 5: Robustness check. Including additional controls.
Age Estimator Females Males
ATT s.e. (obs.) ATT s.e (obs.)
ALL
Mean Di¤erence -0.271 0.012 N1=2,528 -0.189 0.016 N1=1,585
OLS -0.252 0.011 N=17,282 -0.205 0.015 N=15,220
Matching -0.232 0.015 -0.213 0.021
16-29
Mean Di¤erence -0.085 0.033 N1=324 -0.109 0.035 N1=354
OLS -0.072 0.032 N=2,766 -0.089 0.033 N=3,649
Matching -0.063 0.051 -0.068 0.040
30-39
Mean Di¤erence -0.309 0.036 N1=589 -0.192 0.037 N1=344
OLS -0.263 0.027 N=4,224 -0.148 0.035 N=3,569
Matching -0.248 0.033 -0.172 0.046
40-49
Mean Di¤erence 0.273 0.019 N1=845 -0.215 0.032 N1=420
OLS -0.287 0.017 N=5,268 -0.256 0.030 N=4,009
Matching -0.307 0.023 -0.287 0.037
50-64
Mean Di¤erence -0.320 0.028 N1=770 -0.217 0.028 N1=467
OLS -0.282 0.021 N=5,024 -0.296 0.025 N=3,993
Matching -0.243 0.030 -0.258 0.034
Note: Other covariates include language, marital status, years of education, tenure, tenure
squared, public sector dummy, sectoral dummies, time and regional dummies.
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Table 6: Matching quality: mean di¤erences in covariates pre and post matching
Before Match After Match
Variable Wellmatch. Overedu. Di¤. Wellmatch. Overedu. Di¤.
Females
Estonian origin 0.036 -0.209 0.245 -0.075 -0.101 0.026
Married 0.006 -0.034 0.040 0.000 -0.018 0.018
Divorced/widowed -0.042 0.247 -0.289 0.084 0.089 -0.004
Years of education -0.003 0.020 -0.024 0.133 0.124 0.008
Age -0.004 0.021 -0.025 0.044 0.059 -0.015
County dummy 1 -0.068 0.396 -0.464 0.223 0.221 0.002
County dummy 2 -0.058 0.341 -0.400 0.057 0.057 0.000
County dummy 3 0.045 -0.263 0.308 -0.053 -0.053 0.000
County dummy 4 -0.088 0.515 -0.604 0.232 0.232 0.000
County dummy 5 0.095 -0.553 0.647 -0.109 -0.109 0.000
County dummy 6 -0.039 0.230 -0.269 0.049 0.049 0.000
County dummy 7 0.015 -0.089 0.105 -0.024 -0.024 0.000
County dummy 8 0.024 -0.143 0.167 -0.045 -0.045 0.000
Males
Estonian origin 0.018 -0.154 0.172 -0.052 -0.074 0.022
Married 0.003 -0.024 0.026 -0.035 -0.050 0.015
Divorced/widowed -0.059 0.506 -0.565 0.057 0.093 -0.036
Years of education -0.009 0.073 -0.082 0.340 0.392 -0.052
Age -0.003 0.026 -0.029 -0.011 0.026 -0.037
County dummy 1 -0.046 0.395 -0.441 0.224 0.223 0.001
County dummy 2 -0.048 0.411 -0.459 0.082 0.082 0.000
County dummy 3 0.014 -0.116 0.130 -0.026 -0.026 0.000
County dummy 4 -0.040 0.345 -0.385 0.195 0.195 0.000
County dummy 5 0.023 -0.195 0.218 -0.038 -0.038 0.000
County dummy 6 0.009 -0.075 0.084 -0.032 -0.032 0.000
County dummy 7 -0.041 0.352 -0.393 0.033 0.033 0.000
County dummy 8 0.036 -0.307 0.343 -0.095 -0.095 0.000
Note: Simple matching bias adjusted (specication contained in Table 3). County dummies 1 to 8
refer to, respectively: Tallinn, Harju (excl. Tallinn), Hiiu, Ida-Viru, Jogeva, Jarva, Laane, Laane-
Viru. Additional county dummies (not shown for clarity) presented identical results. These are:
Polva, Parnu, Rapla, Saare, Tartu, Valga, Viljandi and Voru.
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Table 7: Sensitivity analysis: e¤ect of calibratedconfounders
Females
Fraction U=1
p11 p10 p01 p00 ATT s.e.
No confounder 0 0 0 0 -0.236 0.014
Neutral confounder 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 -0.240 0.016
Confounder distributed like age 0.54 0.42 0.48 0.45 -0.239 0.017
Other confounders:
a) 0.90 0.80 0.20 0.10 -0.159 0.024
b) 0.90 0.70 0.20 0.10 -0.162 0.023
c) 0.90 0.60 0.20 0.10 -0.165 0.023
d) 0.90 0.50 0.20 0.10 -0.167 0.023
e) 0.90 0.50 0.30 0.10 -0.130 0.021
f) 0.90 0.50 0.40 0.10 -0.104 0.019
g) 0.90 0.50 0.40 0.00 -0.031 0.017
Note: The rst four columns contain the parameters pij used to simulate the binary confounder
(U) in the way described in section 6. The subsequent columns contain the simulated ATT when
controlling for U over 100 iterations and their standard error (s.e.).
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Table 8: Sensitivity analysis: e¤ect of calibratedconfounders
Males
Fraction U=1
p11 p10 p01 p00 ATT s.e.
No confounder 0 0 0 0 -0.246 0.021
Neutral confounder 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 -0.243 0.022
Confounder distributed like age 0.53 0.49 0.49 0.45 -0.241 0.023
Other confounders:
a) 0.90 0.80 0.20 0.10 -0.142 0.030
b) 0.90 0.70 0.20 0.10 -0.153 0.030
c) 0.90 0.60 0.20 0.10 -0.158 0.029
d) 0.90 0.50 0.20 0.10 -0.162 0.029
e) 0.90 0.50 0.30 0.10 -0.118 0.027
f) 0.90 0.50 0.40 0.10 -0.092 0.025
g) 0.90 0.50 0.40 0.00 0.052 0.024
Note: The rst four columns contain the parameters pij used to simulate the binary confounder
(U) in the way described in section 6. The subsequent columns contain the simulated ATT when
controlling for U over 100 iterations and their standard error (s.e.).
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